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Recent events involving major insurance companies and insurance brokerage firms highlight 
substantial incentive problems in commercial and reinsurance markets where intermediation takes 
place. We show that in markets with informed as well as uninformed consumers and heterogeneous 
risk profiles intermediation has the potential to improve social welfare. However, since intermediation 
reduces insurers’ market power, incentives for tacit collusion are higher compared to markets without 
intermediation. A controversial matter in the discussion concerning insurance intermediation is the 
issue of compensation customs. Our analysis provides explanations for the counterintuitive 
observation that brokers are usually compensated by insurance companies. The rationale for the latter 
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1. Introduction 
Middlemen play an important role in markets with considerable market imperfections. 
Essentially, as pointed out by Yavas (1994) there are two different types of intermediaries that 
facilitate market transactions. Market makers, on the one hand, like stock market specialists, 
act on their own account by buying a certain good from a seller at an ask price and reselling it 
to buyers at a bid price. On the other hand, matchmakers, like real estate brokers, simply 
match sellers and buyers without being an active trading party. In addition, as studied by 
Biglaiser (1993), middlemen are usually experts with superior information about market 
conditions and product characteristics. Hence, they may enhance market efficiency by 
providing additional consulting services for market participants. 
In insurance markets brokers act mainly as matchmakers and offer supplementary 
services for both policyholders and insurance companies. The social profitability of 
intermediation depends on the market environment in which transactions take place. In non-
commercial insurance markets a broker primarily is concerned with analyzing the insured’s 
risk profile. Given the consumer’s individual need for coverage the matching product could 
be purchased from a variety of carriers. 
In this paper we will concentrate on professional insurance markets, where risk 
profiles are complex and coverage solutions tend to be more individualized. In this case the 
majority of professional consumers might be able to assess their own needs quite accurately. 
However, because of capacity limits and product differentiation, the broker’s function of 
finding a matching insurer becomes more important. The broker’s comparative advantage in 
this context is the superior market overview. For instance, brokers can determine the 
necessary coverage and seek for appropriate offers among different carriers. In addition, 
brokers typically assume other functions such as the administration of the policy and the 
transfer of payments between the two parties. Subsequently, it is not very surprising that   4
brokers are important intermediaries particularly in the context of commercial property and 
liability insurance as well as in reinsurance. 
However, recent events involving major insurance companies and insurance brokerage 
firms highlight substantial incentive problems in commercial and reinsurance markets where 
intermediation takes place. In one situation, collusion between an American insurance broker 
and several insurance companies took place.
1 A coalition of commercial insurance companies 
agreed to pay “contingent commissions” for brokers, which exceed the size of commonly paid 
commissions. In return, the receiving brokers presented their customers high premium 
pseudo-offers of other coalition members. In another case, German commercial insurance 
companies established a tacit cartel in order to decrease price competition and to enforce 
higher premiums as a reorganization measure. They particularly agreed to unify terms and 
conditions and exerted pressure on companies, which tried to lever the cartel, by excluding 
them from certain pooling solutions.
2 
In the spirit of Varian (1980) and Schultz (2004, 2005), this paper considers a 
Hotelling market with differentiated products, where some consumers are unaware of their 
own risk profile and market prices. In a situation without intermediation uninformed 
consumers match randomly with one of two suppliers which leads to a significant 
inefficiency. In this situation, price competition is not very intensive and suppliers make 
strictly positive profits. When the costs for an individual risk analysis are sufficiently low, 
intermediation is potentially beneficial from a social planner’s point of view, see for instance 
Baye and Cosimano (1989) or Cosimano (1996). However, the increase of market 
transparency intensifies competition between suppliers and lowers their profits. Therefore, 
markets with intermediation or high transparency are susceptible to tacit collusion, see, e.g., 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Ruquet, M. and D. Hays, 2004, Spitzer Sues Marsh For Payoffs; 2 AIG Executives Plead Guilty, 
National Underwriter / Property & Casualty Risk & Benefits 108: 6 – 10. 
2 See, Bundeskartellamt, 2005, “Bundeskartellamt verhängt 130 Mio. Euro Bußgeld gegen Industrieversicherer,“ 
Press release, March 23.   5
Schultz (2005). As a further consequence, the suppliers’ cartel has reasonable incentives to 
include the considered broker into their coalition. Furthermore, incentives for tacit collusion 
can affect the way intermediaries are compensated. Usually two remuneration regimes 
compete with each other: commission and fee-for-advice systems. For an analysis of these 
systems in life insurance markets with more than one intermediary and its impact on advice 
quality see for example Gravelle (1994). 
The main purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, as a starting point, we highlight the 
potential profitability of insurance intermediation in a Hotelling insurance market with 
uninformed consumers in either remuneration system. Secondly, we analyze incentives for 
collusive behavior and evaluate the specific role of insurance brokers within the three-tier 
relationship between policyholders, insurance brokers and insurance companies. With this 
respect, we give a theoretical explanation of why a commission system which is weakly 
preferable from an insurer’s point of view is predominant in real insurance markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model framework 
is introduced and a situation without intermediation is analyzed. The potential advantages of 
intermediation without collusion are considered in section 3. Consequently, in section 4, we 
regard the possibility of collusion between suppliers and evaluate the specific role of brokers 
in markets with uninformed consumers. Finally, the paper concludes in section 5. 
 
2. Model without intermediation 
The purpose of this section is to characterize the market result without intermediation and to 
determine the welfare loss which is due to the presence of uninformed consumers on the 
insurance market. Following D’Aspremont et al. (1979), Hotelling (1929) and Schultz (2004), 
we consider an insurance market with risk neutral consumers that have heterogeneous   6
preferences.
3 A consumer is located at  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ x , which represents her individual preferences 
concerning the product characteristics. She purchases one insurance policy at most. There are 
two insurance companies,  1 , 0 = j , which are located at the two extremes of the city. 
Company 0  offers a policy at  0 = x  and company 1 at  1 = x . 
Since insurance is a very complex product, it is assumed that only a fraction φ  of 
consumers is informed about their precise risk profile or, technically, their location in the 
interval  [] 1 , 0 , the insurance premiums and the firms’ location. Informed and uninformed 
consumers are uniformly distributed on locations. 
Consumers face a disutility from consuming an imperfect insurance product, which 
increases in the distance to the insurance company. If insurance companies charge premiums 
0 p  and  1 p , consumer  x receives a net utility  tx p v − − 0  from buying a policy from insurer 0  
and  () x t p v − − − 1 1  from buying a policy from insurer 1. An informed consumer is 










≡ = . (1) 
Uninformed consumers only form expectations regarding their own risk profile 
e x  and 
firm  i’s premium 
e
j p . Their respective net utility of buying insurance coverage is 
e e tx p v − − 0  if coverage is purchased from company 0  and  ( )
e e x t p v − − − 1 1  if consumers 
buy from insurer 1. Since we concentrate on symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies
4 
where both insurance companies set the same price and serve both groups of consumers, 
uninformed consumers with rational expectations  2 1 =
e x  are ex ante indifferent between 
both firms. Consequently, they randomly choose their insurance carrier. Subsequently, we 
assume that each insurance company attracts half of the uninformed consumers. 
                                                 
3 This assumption is due to simplicity reasons, since throughout the paper we are not interested in any risk 
allocation problems. 
4 For further analyses concerning mixed strategy equilibria and the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium see, 
e.g., Schultz (2005) and Varian (1980).    7
If the willingness to pay for consumers is sufficiently large and  t c v 2
3 + ≥  holds, the 
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The expected net utility of an uninformed consumer 
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Comparing (7) and (8) reveals the welfare loss due to the random matching of 
insurance companies and uninformed consumers. Since the latter have no information about   8
their own location, they choose their respective insurance company randomly. Thus, from a 
social planner’s point of view, half of the uninformed consumers match with the wrong 
insurance company. This mismatching causes a welfare loss of 
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The overall welfare in the economy, given by the sum of ex ante net utility ( )
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and insurers’ profits ∑
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2 * φ
t c v . (11) 
This overall welfare will only be obtained, if the insurers offer their products at the initially 
considered positions 0 and 1. However, profit maximizing locations would be outside [0,1]. 
Thus, products will be more heterogeneous, if firms can decide about their location. A 
location outside the interval would lead to a decrease in social welfare, because costs of a 
mismatch are increasing for all consumers.
5 
 
3. Intermediation without collusion 
In this section a completely non-strategic insurance broker or middleman is incorporated into 
the analysis. We focus on the welfare increasing effect of an honest intermediary who 
exclusively improves the matching process between uninformed consumers and insurance 
companies.  
In the considered situation a middleman can only be valuable, if he has – compared to 
uninformed consumers and insurance companies – access to superior information. To keep 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Schultz (2004)   9
things as simple as possible, the middleman is assumed to be endowed with an information 
technology that incurs variable cost  0 > k  and reveals the position x of a consumer perfectly. 
Our analysis will be divided into two parts which differ with respect to the payment 
structure between insurance company, broker and consumer. In the first case, the broker is 
compensated directly by the insureds (fee-for-advice system). Particularly, neither 
communication nor monetary transfers between the broker and the insurance company are 
taking place. The insurance company can not distinguish between informed and previously 
uninformed consumers, who gained their information from the broker. In the second case, 
insurance companies pay the broker (commission system). 
Let us now turn to the analysis of the fee-for-advice remuneration system. The 
sequence of the game is as follows: At stage 1 insurance companies simultaneously announce 
their prices  p . Then, at stage 2, the middleman makes a price offer m  for an individual risk 
analysis.
6 At stage 3, uninformed consumers decide whether to request a risk analysis or not. 
Finally, at stage 4, all consumers decide whether and where to purchase an insurance policy.
7 
Solving the game by backward induction and assuming v to be sufficiently high, we 
start analyzing stage 4. Given the equilibrium price offers 
f p , uninformed consumers who 
decided not to have a risk analysis performed by the middleman still choose their insurer at 
random. Furthermore, informed consumers buy their insurance policy at the “nearest” 
insurance company. Uninformed consumers prefer to become informed about their own 
location, if 








≤ ⇔ − − ≥ − − − . (12) 
                                                 
6 We do not consider any specific kind of explicit negotiations with any arbitrary allocation of bargaining power, 
because this would just lead to a reallocation of rents between the middleman and insurance companies. 
7 Since in equilibrium all uninformed consumers either ask for the broker’s services or remain uninformed, other 
sequences have no impact on the qualitative results. The game could be reorganized without any loss of 
generality so that the broker offers the price for his service at stage 1, just before the insurers announce their 
premiums.   10
If  () t k 4 / 1 ≤ , the middleman makes non-negative profits of  () ( ) k m
f − − = φ κ 1.
8 In 
this situation all uninformed consumers purchase the risk analysis and become informed about 
their own risk profile. In a situation where the performance of a risk analysis is not profitable 
and  () t k 4 1 > , all uniformed consumers prefer to remain uniformed about their risk profile. 
Therefore, no intermediation takes place and the equilibrium results derived in section 2 are 
unchanged. 
The profitability condition  ( )t k 4 / 1 ≤  has direct implications for the relevance of 
intermediation in different types of insurance markets. As the product space in our model is 
normalized to one, we cannot directly model different types of markets. Our model, however, 
still enables us to draw conclusions based upon specific characteristics of commercial versus 
individual insurance markets. Obviously, given the product space different kinds of insurance 
markets can in our framework be characterized by the parameters k  and t. 
Real insurance markets’ structure suggests that intermediation tends to be more 
relevant in commercial and reinsurance than in non-commercial markets. Our framework 
provides theoretical explanations for this observation. One could argue that the range of 
potential risk profiles in commercial markets is relatively larger than in non-commercial 
markets, implying that the disutility of mismatching ceteris paribus is greater in commercial 
markets. 
When the risk analysis performed by the middleman is profitable, eventually each 
consumer makes an informed decision. Using  1 = φ  and  t m 4 1 0 ≤ ≤
9, the equilibrium 
analysis of section 2 leads directly to the equilibrium premium 
t c p
f + =  (13) 
and a resulting equilibrium profit of 
                                                 
8 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that uninformed consumers accept the offer, if they are indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting. 
9 Again, a variation of m can be interpreted as a change in the allocation of bargaining power between the parties 
involved.   11
2
t f
j = π . (14) 
In a situation in which consumers pay the brokerage fees directly, the ex ante expected 
net utility of informed and uninformed consumer is given by 
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Rearranging (17) leads to 
() k t c v




Given that intermediation is profitable, and  ( )t k 4 / 1 ≤  holds, the lower bound for (18) 






− − ≥ Φ t c v
f φ
. (19) 
In this case, intermediation leads to an increase in welfare if and only if  () t k 4 / 1 < . 
Thus, if intermediation is individually rational for uninformed consumers, it will also be 
profitable from a social planner’s point of view. However, comparing (6) and (14) one can 
easily see that market intermediation by a middleman reduces the insurers’ profits. 
Turning towards the commission system, we will address whether or not the latter 
result concerning the weak social profitability of intermediation remains the same. The   12
analysis again is divided into two parts. First we assume that insurers cannot distinguish 
between the different groups of consumers and therefore offer only one price. The second step 
will introduce the possibility of price discrimination, which gives insurance companies the 
opportunity to offer different prices for informed and uninformed consumers.  
For the analysis of the first case, we can directly use the results of section 2 and 
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Using the symmetry of the problem, one obtains the price level of 
() () ( ) t m c p t m c p
c + − + = ⇔ = + − − − − φ φ 1 0 1 . (22) 
and a resulting equilibrium profit of 
2
t c
j = π . (23) 
The result equals the one for the situation in which the insureds pay for the broker’s 
service. The only difference is a redistribution of income from informed to uninformed 
consumers since the latter only pay a fraction ( )m φ − 1  of the risk analysis fee. 
Now consider the case of price discrimination. The price for informed consumers 
d
i p can be derived directly from the analysis in section 2 as 
t c p
d
i + = . (24) 
Uninformed consumers additionally pay for the broker’s services. The insurance 
companies maximize the premium offers subject to the restriction that the consumers’ net 
utility is not lower than in the case in which the broker is directly paid by the consumer. This   13
condition is due to the fact that the broker would still be able to offer its services directly to 
the insureds who could subsequently purchase insurance at the price for informed consumers. 
The latter constraint leads directly to 
m t c p
d
u + + = . (25) 
Using the prices 
d
i p , 
d
u p  and assuming that the insurer pays the amount m  to the broker, the 
profit for an individual insurer is given by 
2
t d
j = π .
10 (26) 
As in section 2 a brief look at the choice of the insurers’ position shows that even if market 
transparency rises to  1 = φ , the profit maximizing location of the insurers is still outside [0,1], 










Considering the analysis in this section, the presence of insurance brokers strengthens 
incentives of insurance companies to override competition in order to raise their profits. In the 
next section we will analyze these incentives and the impact of tacit collusion between 
insurance companies upon welfare and middlemen compensation. 
 
4. Intermediation and tacit collusion 
In the previous section the middleman’s only function was to provide information for 
uninformed consumers. After the revelation of information by the broker, consumers are able 
to find the best matching product by themselves. In order to introduce the possibility of 
collusion, we now extend the previous game structure by introducing a stage 0 where 
                                                 
10 However, insurance companies may be able to increase their profits by only paying a fraction of m  to the 
broker. Since the broker’s cost of risk analysis is  m k < , the insurer’s maximum possible profit is 
() ( ) k m
t d
j − − + = φ π 1
2
~ , which includes a redistribution of income from the broker to the insurance companies 
but has no effect on social welfare. Nevertheless, for the remainder of the analysis we will not consider such a 
situation. 
   14
insurance companies bargain over explicit contracts. Then they present the middleman with a 
certain offer for his service. The limiting fact for the coalition is the payoffs in the case 
without collusion. Particularly, the following participation constraints  
2
t tc
j ≥ π . (27) 
and 
0 ≥
tc κ  (28) 
must hold. 
Condition (27) considers the fact that an insurance company’s individual profit under 
tacit collusion must weakly exceed the profits 
f
j π  or 
c
j π  without collusion. The non-
negativity constraint (28) is due to the ability of the colluding insurers to exclude the broker 
from the market. If the broker offers a fee-for-advice service simultaneously, the sum of fee, 
insurance premium and costs of mismatch of an uninformed consumer would exceed his 
initial willingness to pay. 
The straightforward approach of the coalition is to maximize their overall profit given 
the limited willingness to pay v. The decision problem regarding the risk analysis is 
unchanged compared to section 3. Therefore, irrespective of the payment arrangements for a 
broker’s service the performance of risk analysis activities is profitable from the coalition’s 
point of view whenever  t k 4
1 ≤  holds. The optimal arrangement has to ensure that 
uninformed consumers purchase the risk analysis service. Moreover, after the risk analysis it 
must be individually rational for all types of consumers to purchase insurance coverage. 
The second constraint is only fulfilled if and only if consumers located at  2
1 = x  that 
face the maximum disutility of  t 2
1  purchase insurance coverage. Surprisingly, the 
participation constraint of consumers has a direct impact on the optimal design of payment 
arrangements.   15
Again, the fee-for-advice and the commissions system have to be analyzed separately. 
At first glance, both payment structures seem to be payoff equivalent from the coalition’s 
point of view. However, this is not the case, as the following considerations clarify. 
Assume a situation where the broker is paid directly by uninformed consumers. 
Consequently, insurance companies are unable to distinguish between informed consumers 
and previously uninformed consumers. Hence, insurance can only be offered at a uniform 
premium. The implementation of a fee  0 > m  paid by uninformed consumers would lower the 
maximum feasible insurance premium for previously uninformed consumers. Therefore, 
insurance companies would have to reduce their premium offers for all consumers by m  in 
order to guarantee participation by all types of consumers. In consequence, the resulting loss 
for the coalition corresponds to  m ⋅ φ  and therefore the payment regime where brokers are 
paid by insurance companies is strictly preferable for the coalition. The maximum possible 





− = . (29) 
The overall profit of the coalition is 
() k t c v




The three potential participants will only join the coalition, if the sum of their 
individual payoffs in the non-collusion case is not higher than (30). Explicitly 
() () () () k t c v k t t φ φ − − − − ≤ − − + ⋅ 1
2
1
4 1 1 2 2  (31) 
must hold. 
Rearranging (31) leads to 









. (32)   16
Generally, collusion between insurance companies will only be beneficial, if the 
disutility of mismatching is considerably low or the intensity of price competition is 
sufficiently high. The LHS of (32) represents the maximum possible profit of an insurance 
coalition in a situation where the offered policies are perfect substitutes. Under these 
conditions, without collusion both companies would make zero profits. Therefore, the 
potential benefits from collusion would be maximized for the coalition, while social welfare 
does not change compared to the competition case. 
Welfare can even be improved by agreeing on terms and conditions, which are 
represented by a change of the position of both insurance companies from  0 = x  and  1 = x  to 
4
1 = x  and  4
3 = x . With this kind of collusion a first-best-optimum can be reached in our 
model, as the expected costs of mismatching are reduced for informed and uninformed 





− =  (33) 
and the overall coalition’s profit is 
() k t c v




Every uninformed consumer should use the broker in order to purchase the best 
product at the fixed price 
fb p , because the maximum costs would be v. Obviously, not 
contacting the broker could lead to a negative expected utility and is therefore not a valuable 
option for uninformed consumers. 
At this point we also have to add the possibility of rationing to our analysis. The 
question is, whether or not it is more profitable for the insurers to increase their prices in order 
to extract additional rents from some consumers, while others do no longer buy insurance, 
because their payment reserves are exceeded. 
In general collusion is only profitable, if   17
f
j








1 t k t c v
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− − − − φ
. (36) 
Using  t k
4
1
≤ , collusion is individually rational for each insurance company if 











On the other hand, given the overall profit of the coalition under collusion 
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rationing is only profitable, if 
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The latter condition is equivalent to 










Comparing (37) with (40) one can easily see that rationing is not advantageous for the 
insurers in the considered context. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In the light of recent events in commercial insurance markets, this paper considers collusion 
incentives and compensation structure for insurance brokers. In markets with uninformed 
consumers and heterogeneous risk profiles, intermediation has the potential to improve social   18
welfare. However, since intermediation reduces insurers’ market power, incentives for tacit 
collusion are higher compared to markets without intermediation. 
A controversial matter in the discussion concerning insurance intermediation is the 
issue of compensation customs. Our analysis provides explanations for the counterintuitive 
observation that brokers are usually compensated by insurance companies. As long as 
intermediation is profitable, it is irrelevant from a social welfare point of view whether 
brokers are paid by uninformed consumers or by insurance companies. From the insurer’s 
point of view though, a system in which brokers are solely compensated by insurance 
companies is strictly preferable when the demand side consists of informed and uninformed 
consumers. The rationale for the latter is the fact that a fee paid by uninformed consumers 
limits the insurers’ opportunity to extract rents from both types of potential insureds. 
A limitation of our analysis is the fact that we do not examine the broker’s incentive 
problem. In our model the broker acts completely non-strategic. Particularly, every 
uninformed consumer is matched with the nearest supplier. However, in reality, brokers may 
have incentives to mismatch uninformed consumers. For example, when commissions for 
different products vary and disutility of mismatching is non-verifiable, brokers are able to 
collect contingent commissions from suppliers for directing additional consumers to them. 
Contrasting our results, such a situation with strategic experts market intermediation may not 
necessarily lead to an increase of social welfare.
11 
                                                 
11  See, e.g., Darby and Karni (1973); Emons (1997); Wolinsky (1993).   19
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